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ABSTRACT
We introduce the social model of disability by reflecting on its origins and legacy, with particular reference to the workof the
Union of the Physically Impaired against Segregation. We argue that there has been a gradual rolling back of the rights and enti‐
tlements associated with the social model of disability. Yet no alternative for the social model has been proposed in response to
such threats to disabled people’s human rights. Disabled people need a stronger social model that acts as a means to a society
which enables and ensures their rights; the right to live a dignified life, as well as to live in an environment that enables people to
flourish with disability.[AQ3]
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A social model legacy
The global disability community and movement sadly recently lost a giant in Mike Oliver. He is often seen as the
father of the social model of disability (Oliver 1983), an expression he first coined. Nonetheless, the social founda‐
tions of the model are contained in the ground-breaking insights of the Union of the Physically Impaired against Seg‐
regation (UPIAS) which originated in 1972 in the United Kingdom. The UPIAS was created by disabled people like
Paul Hunt, Vic Finkelstein, and Ken and Maggie Davis. They all had local and global experiences of segregation. For
example, Hunt (1966) drew on his experiences of being stigmatised and institutionalised in theUnited Kingdom; and
Finkelstein (2001) on his experiences in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, where he realised his impris‐
onment was more accessible to him than general society. The UPIAS argue that:
… it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impair‐
ments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. (1976, 4)
It is worth noting that the UPIAS (1976) did not disregard impairment and understood that a person could have
(mild) impairment with no experiences of disablement and exclusion from society.
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Similarly, the UPIAS (1976) noted the need for medical treatment of impairment but protested against medical
understandings (or medical models) being the sole way in which disability is understood. In this way, they also ar‐
gued against medical and other professional controls or power over disabled people’s lives, arguing for independence
but also integrated or interdependent living. Maggie and Ken Davis demonstrated this in the way in which they
formed a cooperative, as well as planned and built an Independent Living Centre run by disabled people. Their defini‐
tion of independence was linked to disabled people having control and making autonomous or supported choices,
about, for example, when to get up, when to eat or what care they wanted from professionals. It was working and
living together interdependently as a family, group or collective with other disabled people that financially and social‐
ly enabled people to have control and choices. It never meant disabled people living in isolation, being imprisoned or
having to manage everything on their own, in keeping with a neoliberal marketplace economy (see Finkelstein 2007).
The aims of the UPIAS were full participation in society and campaigning focused on the plurality of all those
issues, whether they were linked to accessing medical care, transport, employment, education and welfare sectors or
ending societal discrimination through rights legislation. The social model had an enormous impact in UK society, by
challenging social discrimination and normative assumptions about disability. It was foundational to the Disability
Discrimination Act (1995) and the later Equality Act (2010) which replaced it, with the idea of protected characteris‐
tics. The social model also influenced the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) (United Nations 2006), which was one of the most innovative and far-reaching pieces of legislation. Yet
while most countries have signed up and ratified the CRPD, it has not always been enforced by national governments
or given adequate resources for implementation.
The social model is sometimes viewed in terms of the removal of barriers or changing attitudes or perceptions. It
is, however, more radical and influential than that. Finkelstein (2007) argued that models had to fit their times and
needed to change with those times. The social model has, however, become fixed into a narrow rights-based ap‐
proach, which saw the acquisition of rights as an end in itself. He foreshadowed this:
The ideological problem facing the disability movement in the UK from the 1990s onwards was whether the social
model of disability was still relevant in guiding our struggle or whether social changes had advanced so far that the
original model no longer reflected the social context in which it had been created? Is the ‘rights’, or ‘potpourri’, mod‐
el of disability now more in tune with the market economy expanding into the health and social services sector of
society? (Finkelstein 2007, 14)
Oliver (2013), too, was not precious about the social model and open to its critiques but felt that all of ‘the talking’
was distracting from the way in which austerity and the broader neoliberal project were eroding the collective rights
that the disability movement had built up in the United Kingdom. The general consensus was that the disability
movement and charities were failing to uphold the rights and entitlements that had been so hard won, with a new
politics of disablement emerging where legislation was being used to police disabled people (Oliver and Barnes
2012).
A social model of human rights?
Much research has been done about the global impact of austerity on the creation of more disability since the eco‐
nomic crisis of 2007–2008. Significant evidence has been published that the rolling back of the welfare state in devel‐
oping countries is also affecting disabled people negatively, and some argue that this has been leading to more im‐
pairment and increased risk of early mortality.[AQ4] This point does not have to be made again, and disabled people
have been at the forefront of global activism and protests against cuts, marketisation and privatisation of services and
the global erosion of their human rights (Berghs et al. 2019). What they have not been given by disabled people is an
alternative to the social model. As some have asked, is the social model fit for purpose or do we need a more active
model to set out an agenda for change (Levitt 2017)?
When our team did research on public health and disability with people who were politically and socially active in
the United Kingdom, they noted that the social model was being eroded but that legislation was still important
(Berghs et al. 2016). It was legislation like the Human Rights Act (1988) that offered people legal protection and a
way in which they could fight to uphold their rights and survive. In many ways, they felt as if the Equality Act (2010)
was acting as a token instrument. Yet, instead of a human rights approach, they argued for a social model of human
rights (Berghs et al. 2017). Our team was excited by this and we thought that the grassroots disability movement and
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individual activists would later begin elucidating what this would consist of. Post Brexit, with the United Kingdom
leaving the European Union, there have also been calls to replace the Human Rights Act (1988) with a British Human
Rights Act, further acting as an impetus to think how the social model could become legislation and create an envi‐
ronment inclusive to disability rather than despite of disability. We have seen from the CRPD (United Nations 2006)
and from what is happening globally in times of austerity that as the economic situation changes, disabled people’s
human rights are being affected and that any new Human Rights Act needs to have a clause to ensure that the rights
of disabled people, as a protected group, cannot be rescinded but should be enforced. Disabled people are currently
being forced to defend their basic ‘needs’, but we argue instead that they have rights to flourish with disability and
that it is society that should enable these rights. This is what a social model of human rights act could set out in legis‐
lative form.
What politically and socially active disabled people are arguing for was what Finkelstein (2007) was elucidating;
they want a social model of human rights that is a means to an end and not the end in itself. It should be a means to
change society (and its collective values), in addition to upholding the human dignity of disabled people’s lives in
every aspect of society. Too often this has been interpreted in terms of singling out disabled people and creating spe‐
cific legislative instruments or having to make accommodations or adjustments for them – this almost identifies disa‐
bility as a problem, instead of changing society to become more inclusive of that diversity as a norm (Williams et al.
2018). We would argue that the current approach of focusing on the removal of barriers, attitudinal change and what
adjustments are ‘needed’ does not encompass social, medical or even charity models of disability. Instead, it creates
the boundaries of what a lack of citizenship, and by extension rights, implies, in terms of a life that lacks true citizen‐
ship and rights in society. This is why, we assume, disabled people argued for a social model of human rights, be‐
cause they felt that their human rights were being denied and eroded by society. It also points to what they wanted the
social model to enable, because it is currently missing in the United Kingdom – rights to be human. This is very
basic, the right to live and have a dignified life as a human being. Disabled people felt that they were not being trea‐
ted as human by society and, because of the impact of austerity, thought some people’s lives were not dignified as
human. We would argue that society should and can do better, in terms of responsibilities of a social contract to all
their citizens, to enable not just living in dignity but being able to flourish with disability. Furthermore, this is a mat‐
ter of justice, equality and rights, which should be established as equitable norms rather than an aspiration associated
with equality of opportunity.
Finkelstein (2007) argued that models are used as tools and only make sense in particular times. While we still do
not think that academics should be the ones outlining what a social model of human rights could look like and what it
is now inclusive of, we think that disabled people now urgently need a new stronger social tool for justice, rights and
entitlements in society. It seems as if instead of focusing on differences and disagreements, the time has come to think
of what unifies; for example, regardless of identity politics and what identities people feel they ascribe to, everyone is
in agreement that the political and economic time has come to say enough is enough and uphold the legacy that disa‐
bled people have been given by reinterpreting what the ‘social’ now means. For example, thinking through how it
links to different types of ‘rights’ in terms of, for example, welcoming a greater diversity and intersectionality of
identities across the life-course, acknowledging experiences of pain, understanding differing needs for interdepend‐
ence or debating what ‘rights’ could be inclusive or exclusive of, and how to sensitively define them in local and
global terms. We hope that we have engaged with the spirit in which disabled people shared these insights with us,
and that we are doing justice to those deliberations and debates (Berghs et al. 2016, 2017) by asking for a new model,
a tool that can act as a hammer (Oliver 2004).
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